International Encyclopedia of Systems and Cybernetics

The supposed capability of the human reason to observe and register reality as it is in itself.

In fact, this is a belief. For H. MARGENAU (as quoted by van GIGCH, 2002, p. 202), to EINSTEIN himself objectivity meant "the belief in an external world, independent of the perceiving subject, (which) is the basis of all natural science".

As we are all "perceiving subjects" and as such unable to escape this condition, we must unavoidably accept it as a postulated foundation for all knowledge. it is however clear that the postulate serves us quite well to understand and manage our surrounding environment… at least as long as we do not delude ourselves.

Objectivity was the bedrock of classical 19th. Century science: "The characters of the observer should never intrude in his/her observations", which imposes the absolute separation of the observer and the observed.

D. Mc NEIL writes: "Despite the persistent myth of perfect objectivity left over from the idealization of mechanism during the nineteenth Century, it has long been understood that, whether it be in quantum uncertainty or in social interaction, every observation is an intervention… more or less. Furthermore, it is absurd to claim that scientific endeavor is detached as long as it strives for "prediction and control" (1993b, p.4).

From a different viewpoint, H.von FOERSTER states that "objectivity" "… is the cognitive version of the physiological blindspot: we do not see what we do not see. Objectivity is a subject's delusion that observing can be done without him" (i.e. as an observer) (American Society for Cybernetics Declaration 1983).

The French economist J. FOURASTIÉ called this "ignorance of ignorance" and the Dutch systemist G.de ZEEUW developed a similar concept under the name of "invisibility".

The possibility of objectivity is indeed a belief, that leads to an ontological postulate. P. DELATTRE, (also quoted by J.L.LE MOIGNE) observes: "The very notion of objectivity is not so limpid as it seems to be. The concept of objectivity is closely linked with the one of more or less universal consensus, but this is certainly not sufficient" (1971, p.8).

This can be more or less easily done in the "objective world of classical science… subsumed as a special case of weak interaction" (i.e. between the observing and the observed systems) (R. GLANVILLE, 1979, p.37)

In other words, that which we call reality seems merely to mirror our most generally shared views about the equivalence of our respective perceptions and the interpretations that we elaborate on them: "objectivity" at its best is merely more or less enlightened and well founded agreement between shared subjectivities. As such, it can exist merely as "… a systemic property of the system of science taken collectively. Objectivity, if it results, occurs from a process of weeding out our conflicting claims" (I.I. MITROFF and H.A. LINSTONE, 1993, p.89).

Practical consequences in any human activity – scientific or other – are portentous: Pretence of objectivity from the part of any stakeholder in any issue is merely either ignored subjectivity or, worse, a attempt to silence anyone proposing different views.

Also C.W. CHURCHMAN came to the conclusion that, as subjectivity can never be excluded, it should be included in any definition of objectivity (1971, p.169-72).

We are led in this way to ontological skepticism, which does not deny the existence of objective reality, but considers that is only possible to know it in a relative way, through more or less shared models, ever susceptible of further revisions.

This is of course the lesson of the whole history of science and, still more generally of human reason.