According to F. ROBB: "… commonly agreed meanings are formed, by negociation or compulsion, between at least two conversants. The formation of meanings, in this context, is taken to include making distinctions between objects in experience (or in thought) and their ground, forming mental models and making valuations about situations and objects; so that 'good' is discriminated from 'bad', 'desirable' from 'undesirable', and 'true' from 'false"'.
Moreover, "Conversations may also negociate what constitute valid ways of making these distinctions and of establishing these values" (1993, p.1).
I. BEESON (1997), after considering HUSSERL's phenomenology and its critique by DERRIDA (1973), and MERLEAU-PONTY's Phenomenology of perception (1962) observes: "Our existence is shown as fundamentally intersubjective, but not as fundamentally rational. Meaning is nowhere constant or fixed, but in achieved by people working together to make sense of a world whose boundaries are constantly reforming. Such work always throws up meanings not prefigured by existing understandings". In short "Rationality is revealed as a superstructure"… and "… a rethorical rather than a logical achievement"
Such a relativity looks suspectedly like quicksands and could easily lead to rational paralysis. It is however for sure necessary to remain careful about so-called meanings.
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Bertalanffy Center for the Study of Systems Science (2020). Title of the entry. In Charles François (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Systems and Cybernetics (2). Retrieved from www.systemspedia.org/[full/url]
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