International Encyclopedia of Systems and Cybernetics

Ludwig von BERTALANFFY summarized as follows the aims of General Systems Theory:

"a) There is a general tendency towards integration in the various sciences: natural and social.

b) Such integration seems to be centered in a general theory of systems.

c) Such theory may be an important means for aiming at exact theory in the non-physical fields of science.

d) Developing unifying principles running "vertically" through the universes of the individual sciences, this theory brings us nearer to the goal of the unity of science.

e) This can lead to a much-needed integration in scientific education.

f) Bringing us closer to the unity of science and the integration of scientific education, this theory could provide a basis for a conceptual synthesis capable of fulfilling the time-honored, but presently unfulfilled functions of conceptual guidance and individual and collective motivation.(1956, p.2)".

Through paragraph b), it can be seen that the author – possibly because of an unfortunate translation from German – did not clearly distinguished General Systems Theory from a General Theory of Systems (not to speak of LE MOIGNE's "Theorie du Système Général"), which produced later on a great deal of confusion and much controversy. (See "G.S.T.: what does the expression mean ?").

He saw however clearly some conceptual traps that his successors did not always avoided. In D. Mc NEIL's words: "He recognized that a half-baked theory of systems would quickly degenerate into insubstantial platitudes and vapid truisms or be trivialized into mere technology (p.16, p.101). He counseled against purely academic theory, saying that "theory without practice is mere intellectual play" (p.101). He warned against the reification of models, e.g. confusing game theory with life or misrepresenting exercises as "problems" (p.22-3, p.101). He cautioned against accepting analogs and analogies as either the complete expression or the definitive proof of systemic theory (p.14, p.35) even if those analogs happened to be his own beloved differential equations. He told us not to misapply systemic attributes across echelons of order, e.g. to suppose that a social system is "Iiving" because its constituents are (p.14). He warned us to eschew reductionism, e.g. to mechanical models in MKSA units, and to respect emergent irreducibility (p.14) and human purpose (p.79)".

D. Mc NEIL comments: "We can also take some advice from several errors which are implicit in von BERTALANFFY's own presentation. Technically, he perpetuates the confusion of "system" with "structure" by his emphasis upon formalism and abstraction without full acknowledgment of the "control" and especially the "content" aspects inherent in systems. Philosophically, he does not address the prospect that a rigidly unified systemic paradigm might emerge as a tyranny in its own right, imposing "one right way" of thinking that would be at least as harmful as any institutionalized monoculture of orthodox fragmentary sciences" (1993, p.19).

BERTALANFFY acknowledged A. LOTKA's priority (1925) as to the concepts of general systemic laws, in the guise of simultaneous differential equations for the definition of complex systems. He gave in his 1955 paper a number of interesting historical references. He was however appearently unaware of A. BOGDANOV's 1922 work in which one can read this striking observation: "In technology and in science, nearly all of the greatest discoveries came from the transfer of methods beyond the limits of the fields in which they originated" (1980, p.24).

K. BOULDING in turn observed (in 1956) that: "In recent years increasing need has been felt for a body of systematic theoretical constructs which will discuss the general relationships of the empirical world. This the quest of General System Theory. It does not seek, of course, to establish a Single, self-contained "general theory of practically everything" which will replace all the special theories of particular disciplines. Such a theory would be almost without content, for we always pay for generality by sacrificing content, and all we can say about practically everything is almost nothing. Somewhere however between the specific that has no meaning and the general that has no content there must be for each purpose and at each level of abstraction an optimum degree of generality… not always reached by the particular sciences" (1956, p.11).

According to E. LASZLO: "The promise of general systems theory consists in 1) discerning natural systems in diverse areas of investigation, i.e. identify those real entities which can be analyzed in terms of general systems laws; 2) providing an inventory of natural systems from atoms to ecologies and possibly to social systems and the world system; 3) formulating the general principles accounting for the evolution of systems on multiple hierarchic levels, crossing the boundaries of the inorganic- organic, the organic-multiorganic, and their many subdivisions, and 4) refering chosen problems of philosophic-scientific-humanistic interest to the systems analysis of the relevant phenomena, carried out in the context of the integrated scheme of hierarchically organized natural systems" (1974, p.19).